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Abstract  
The effects of soft errors in processor cores have been widely studied. 
However, little has been published about soft errors in uncore components, 
such as memory subsystem and I/O controllers, of a System-on-a-Chip 
(SoC). In this work, we study how soft errors in uncore components affect 
system-level behaviors. We have created a new mixed-mode simulation 
platform that combines simulators at two different levels of abstraction, 
and achieves 20,000× speedup over RTL-only simulation. Using this 
platform, we present the first study of the system-level impact of soft 
errors inside various uncore components of a large-scale, multi-core SoC 
using the industrial-grade, open-source OpenSPARC T2 SoC design. Our 
results show that soft errors in uncore components can significantly 
impact system-level reliability. We also demonstrate that uncore soft 
errors can create major challenges for traditional system-level checkpoint 
recovery techniques. To overcome such recovery challenges, we present a 
new replay recovery technique for uncore components belonging to the 
memory subsystem. For the L2 cache controller and the DRAM controller 
components of OpenSPARC T2, our new technique reduces the 
probability that an application run fails to produce correct results due to 
soft errors by more than 100× with 3.32% and 6.09% chip-level area and 
power impact, respectively. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
B.8.1 Reliability, Testing, and Fault-Tolerance 
General Terms: Reliability, Resilience. 
Keywords: Soft Error, Uncore Components, Simulation, Recovery 
1. Introduction 
Radiation-induced soft errors pose a major challenge to building robust 
systems using complex System-on-Chips (SoCs). Although the soft error 
rate at the device level (e.g., SRAM cell or latch) stays roughly constant or 
even decreases over technology generations, the system-level soft error rate 
increases as more devices are integrated into SoCs [Mitra 14, Seifert 10, 12]. 
Uncore components1, such as cache controllers, DRAM controllers and 
I/O controllers, are increasingly important because their overall area 
footprint and power consumption in SoCs are comparable to that of 
processor cores [Gupta 12, Li 13]. The need for studying soft errors in 
uncore components has been pointed out in the literature [Mukherjee 05, 
Quinn 13]. While there are many studies on soft errors in processor cores 
(e.g., [Cho 13, Ramachandran 08, Wang 04]), few have studied soft errors 
in uncore components. The lack of such studies can be attributed to the 
difficulties in modeling large-scale SoCs (with multiple processor cores 
and multiple uncore components) for the following reasons. 
1. Uncore studies should model the entire SoC because uncore components 
interact with processor cores and other uncore components. Modeling 
only a part of the system may not capture uncore behaviors accurately. 
2. Studying system-level effects of soft errors requires real-world applications. 
This becomes more relevant in the context of cross-layer resilience, where 
multiple error resilience techniques from various layers of the system stack 
are combined to achieve cost-effective solutions [DeHon 10, Mitra 10, 14].  
3. For statistically significant results, a large number of error injection 
samples are required. For example, when observing a certain outcome 
rate, more than 40,000 samples are required to achieve ±0.1% accuracy 
with 95% confidence when the observed rate is 1%2.  
Such requirements demand high-throughput error simulation or 
emulation platforms. RTL simulators that model detailed error behaviors 
are extremely slow. For example, RTL simulation of an out-of-order, 
superscalar processor core achieves less than a thousand cycles per 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
1 Also be referred to as “nest,” “outside-core,” or “northbridge”. In this paper, we use this term 
to refer to components that are not processors or accelerators. 
2This assumes the normal approximation of the binomial distribution, similar to the confidence 
interval used in [Choi 90]. 
second [Maniatakos 11b]. High-level simulators, on the other hand, 
achieve much faster simulation times [Simics]. However, naïvely 
injecting errors into abstracted high-level layers without adequate low-
level details can result in highly inaccurate results (e.g., results in [Cho 13] 
for processor cores).  
Existing uncore error studies are limited to very small designs (e.g., 
private L1 cache and bus controller in a design with a single processor 
core [Bailan 10]) or rely on fast high-level simulators without low-level 
details (e.g., error injections into primary input and output signals in 
[Graham 09, Lin 06]). While radiation testing can be used to study overall 
soft error resilience of a design [Bender 08, Sanda 08], it is only available 
after the chip is produced. Also, quantifying vulnerabilities of various on-
chip components can be difficult using radiation testing due to limited 
observability.  
In this paper, we make the following contributions: 
1. We present a simulation platform that is capable of simulating large-
scale SoCs while modeling detailed flip-flop soft errors3. Compared to 
RTL-only simulation, this platform achieves over 20,000× speedup. 
2. We present the first study of system-level effects of soft errors in uncore 
components in a large-scale OpenSPARC T2 SoC with 500 million 
transistors, eight processor cores, and many uncore components 
[OpenSPARC]. We report quantified results on the effects of soft errors in 
L2 cache controllers, DRAM controllers, crossbar interconnects, and PCI 
Express I/O controllers. We show that soft errors in uncore components can 
have significant reliability impact comparable to that of processor cores.  
3. We show that traditional system-level checkpoint recovery techniques 
that generally target processor cores are inadequate for uncore 
components.  
4. We present a new soft error recovery technique called Quick Replay 
Recovery (QRR). We demonstrate the effectiveness of QRR for the L2 
cache controller and the DRAM controller in the OpenSPARC T2 design. 
QRR results in 100× improvement (i.e., reduction) of the probability that 
an application run fails to produce correct results due to soft errors; the 
corresponding chip-level area and power impact for all L2C and MCU 
instances are 3.32% area and 6.09%, respectively. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our 
mixed-mode simulation platform and our soft error analysis methodology. 
Section 3 presents uncore soft error injection results. Section 4 discusses 
system-level checkpoint recovery challenges for uncore components. 
Section 5 discusses the accuracy of our mixed-mode simulation platform. 
Section 6 presents QRR. Section 7 concludes this paper.  
2. Mixed-mode Soft Error Simulation Platform 
To analyze the effects of uncore soft errors in large-scale SoCs, we 
created  a mixed-mode platform that combines two simulation 
platforms (sometimes referred to as co-simulation in design validation 
literature [Benini 03]). The target uncore component is simulated using an 
RTL simulator to model soft error behaviors with low-level details, while 
the rest of the system is simulated using a high-level simulator. Our 
mixed-mode platform is different from existing co-simulation-based 
studies on error behaviors for the following reasons: 
1. [Li 09, Ejlali 03] use co-simulation to study errors in small 
combinational logic blocks, such as the ALU or the decoder module 
with only a few hundred gates, inside a processor core. To correctly 
model how soft errors in flip-flops behave inside an uncore component, 
we model an entire uncore component (more than 100K gates) using 
RTL, and ensure that state transfer between the RTL simulator and the 
high-level simulator does not become a performance bottleneck.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
3In this paper, we focus on flip-flop soft errors for the following reasons: a) Design techniques to 
protect them are generally expensive. Coding techniques are routinely used for protecting on-chip 
memories. b) Combinational circuits are significantly less susceptible to soft errors [Seifert 12].  
 2. [Goswami 97, Kalbarczyk 99] profile high-level effects resulting from 
low-level errors, and use the statistical information for quick error 
simulations. Profiled error behaviors may not reflect subsequent error 
propagations due to interactions with the rest of the system (e.g., a flip-
flop error in a module may result in multiple erroneous interactions 
with other components [Cho 13]). We model how the error interacts in 
a chip by simulating its behavior at the entire chip level until all the 
effects from the injected error have been fully modeled. 
3. [Wang 04] uses two simulators at two different levels of abstraction to 
simulate a processor core, but only one of the simulators is used at a 
given point in time. This requires transferring the entire system state 
between the simulators. In our platform, we utilize low-level simulation 
only for the target uncore component. This reduces state transfer and 
low-level simulation overheads. 
FPGA emulation platforms can achieve faster speeds compared to RTL 
simulations while modeling low-level details [Asaad 12, Schelle 10]. 
However, to model an entire SoC, the design may need to be mapped on 
multiple FPGA chips. This is because the area required for the FPGA 
implementation of a design can be an order of magnitude greater than an 
ASIC implementation (for the same technology generation) [Kuon 07]. 
As a result, limited inter-FPGA I/O bandwidth can limit the overall 
emulation speed to only a few MHz [Hauck 10].   
2.1 Mixed-mode Platform Simulation Modes 
Our platform operates in two modes: 
1. Accelerated mode (Fig. 1a): All components on the chip, including 
processor cores and uncore components, are simulated using the Simics 
instruction-set simulator [Simics]. The uncore components are 
simulated using high-level models. Under error-free conditions, they 
produce the same output signals to processor cores as the actual uncore 
components (Fig. 1a ①). Table 1 lists the uncore states modeled by the 
high-level uncore models (high-level uncore state). Flip-flops inside 
uncore components are not fully modeled in this mode.  
2. Co-simulation mode (Fig. 1b): The target uncore component is 
simulated using an RTL simulator. Processor cores access uncore 
components by exchanging requests and return packets through the on-
chip interconnect (e.g., PCX and CPX packets in OpenSPARC T2). 
During co-simulation mode, these access packets to and from the 
uncore component are transferred between the high-level simulator and 
the RTL simulator (Fig. 1b ②). To ensure cycle-level accuracy, the two 
simulators are synchronized every cycle to ensure transfer of packets 
between simulators at the correct cycle.  
Although the accelerated mode cannot simulate how a soft error behaves 
at the flip-flop level, high-level models can correctly simulate subsequent 
behaviors after a flip-flop soft error fully propagates to the high-level 
uncore state (i.e., no flip-flop or SRAM array inside the uncore 
component, not included in the high-level uncore state, contains an error). 
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Figure 1. Mixed-mode platforms. (a) Accelerated mode. (b) Co-simulation mode.  
Table 1. High-level uncore states modeled by the high-level uncore models. 
Uncore component High-level uncore states (size per instance) 
L2 cache controller 
Tag address array (28KB), Cache line state 
bit array (5KB),Cache data array (512KB), 
L1 cache directory (2KB) 
DRAM controller DRAM contents (4GB) 
Crossbar interconnect None
4
 
PCI Express I/O controller Transfer buffers (RX: 8KB, TX: 4KB) 
2.2 Soft Error Injection Methodology 
Figure 2 shows the flowchart of our uncore error injection methodology 
using our mixed-mode platform. The co-simulation mode is invoked only 
when soft error injection begins and terminated when the injected error 
disappears without any remaining error or when the remaining errors can 
be simulated using the accelerated mode.  
1. Start application using a saved snapshot
2. Run until the error injection cycle
3. Transfer the current uncore state to
the RTL simulator
4. Warm-up uncore components
5. Inject bit-flip error into the target flip-flop
6. Run co-simulation
7. Remaining errors?
11. Continue application execution
12. Determine application outcome
Yes
No
8. Error propagation?
No
Yes
9. Error vanished
10. Transfer the current (erroneous) uncore 
state back to the high-level uncore model
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
  
Figure 2. Error injection using our new mixed-mode simulation platform. 
Steps in grey color uses co-simulation mode. 
Phase 1. Prepare for Error Injection: For each error injection run, an 
error injection cycle from high-level simulation (in accelerated mode) and a 
target flip-flop inside the target uncore component are randomly selected. 
The mixed-mode platform starts application execution in accelerated mode 
and simulates the application until the error injection cycle (Fig. 2, steps 1 
and 2). This step is shortened by starting the simulation using one of the 
system state snapshots obtained from a one-time, error-free execution of the 
application in accelerated mode. If the error injection cycle is Ci and the 
snapshots are created every Cf cycles, the simulation is started using a 
snapshot created at cycle Cs, where Cs=⌊Ci/Cf⌋×Cf. For our error injection 
runs, we created a snapshot every 2 million cycles.  
When RTL simulation starts (Fig. 2, step 3), high-level uncore states 
that have been simulated by the high-level model (Fig. 1a ①) are 
transferred to the target uncore component in the RTL simulator (Fig. 1b 
③). A warm-up period is required before the error injection to correctly 
restore all microarchitectural states (e.g., flip-flops and small SRAM 
buffers) that have not been simulated by the high-level model (Fig. 2, step 
4). The actual warm-up period is randomly selected for each run to avoid 
injecting errors always after the same number of co-simulation cycles. In 
our platform, the warm-up period is at least 1,000 cycles, which is enough 
to reconstruct microarchitectural states for the tested OpenSPARC T2 
uncore components (detailed discussion in Sec. 4.1).  
Phase 2. Inject Error: A bit-flip error is injected into the selected flip-
flop (Fig. 1b ④, Fig. 2, step 5). The platform periodically checks if the 
accelerated mode can take over the simulation by checking remaining 
errors in RTL (Fig. 2, steps 6-7). This check is done by comparing the 
values of the storage elements (flip-flops, SRAM arrays) in the target 
uncore component, where the error is injected (Fig. 1b ③), with the 
corresponding values in the golden component (Fig. 1b ⑤). The golden 
component is an identical copy of the target uncore component that 
receives the same input, but simulated without error injection. It is only 
used for simulation purposes to check when to end the co-simulation 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
4  The crossbar interconnect only delivers packets between processor cores and L2 cache 
controllers. Therefore, its states can be reconstructed in the co-simulation mode without 
modeling a separate high-level uncore state for the crossbar in the accelerated mode. 
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 mode. The co-simulation mode is no longer needed if the comparison finds 
no mismatch or all mismatches satisfy one of the following conditions: 
1. The mismatch can be directly mapped to high-level uncore states. The 
subsequent effects can be simulated by using the accelerated mode. 
2. The mismatch does not cause any functional difference (e.g., corrupted 
data field when the associated valid flag is not set; the value won’t be 
used by the application in that case). 
Phase 3. Determine Application Outcome: The current uncore state in 
RTL is transferred back to the high-level model, and the mixed-mode 
platform continues to run the application to completion in the accelerated 
mode to determine if the application run results in any erroneous outcome 
(Fig. 2, steps 10-12). Possible outcome types are listed in Sec. 3.2. 
During phase 2, the platform monitors if an injected error has produced 
erroneous return packets to the processor cores by comparing return 
packets from the target uncore component to those of the golden uncore 
component (Fig. 1b ⑥). If no erroneous return packet has been detected 
and the transferred state from the target uncore component matches that 
from the golden uncore component, the error injection run will result in 
the same outcome as that of the error-free run. For those cases, the 
simulation can stop early without executing the rest of the application in 
phase 3 (Fig. 2, steps 8-9).  
2.3 Mixed-mode Simulation Performance  
The effective simulation throughput of the mixed-mode platform is 
over 2M cycles/sec, comparable to that of multi-FPGA platforms for 
large-scale SoCs [Asaad 12, Schelle 10]. Compared to RTL-only 
simulation of the OpenSPARC T2 design (up to 100 cycles/sec only 
[Weaver 08]), we achieve more than 20,000× speedup. By utilizing saved 
snapshots, steps 1-2 take only 1M cycles on average. Steps 11-12 are 
executed only for less than 1% of total error injection runs5. Table 2 
summarizes the performance of our mixed-mode platform when 
simulating an application with cycle length L for the OpenSPARC T2 
design. For applications with cycle lengths longer than 280M, the 
throughput is over 2M cycles/sec. Applications with shorter lengths 
achieve throughput values less than 2M cycles/sec (e.g., the Radix 
application with L=120M in Sec. 3.2. achieves 1M cycles/sec); however, 
those applications require shorter simulation times. 
Throughput = 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
𝑎𝑣𝑔.  𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
 = 𝐿
70 +
𝐿
4𝑀
⁄ > 2M cycles/sec, (L >280M) 
Table 2. Mixed-mode simulation performance per each step. 
Simulation type 
Cycles 
(average) 
Performance 
(cycles/sec.) 
Execution time 
(sec.) 
Mixed-mode 
simulation 
Steps 1-2 1M 20K 50 
Steps 3-10 10K 500 20 
Steps 11-12 L/2 × 1% 20K L/4M 
Total 70+L/4M 
3. Soft Error Injection Results for Uncore Components 
Using the mixed-mode error injection platform, we performed soft 
error injection runs for uncore components in the OpenSPARC T2 design 
(Table 3). In this paper, we study soft errors in the L2 cache controller 
(L2C), the DRAM controller (MCU), the Crossbar interconnect (CCX), 
and the PCI Express I/O controller (PCIe)6.  
Table 3. Processor core and uncore components in OpenSPARC T2. 
Component 
Number of 
Instances 
Number of Flip-flops 
(per instance) 
Gate count 
(per instance) 
Processor Core 8 44,288 513,597 
L2C 8 31,675 210,540 
MCU 4 18,068 155,726 
CCX 1 41,521 370,738 
PCIe
7
 1 29,022 376,988 
NIU 1 135,699 1,297,427 
SIU 1 16,908 105,695 
NCU 1 17,338 143,374 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
5 Since a run may be terminated or may become unresponsive (UT or Hang outcome type in 
Sec. 3.2) before step 11, the percentage of runs that require simulation steps 11 and 12 is less 
than the sum of all erroneous outcome rates presented in Sec, 3.3. 
6 NIU, SIU, and NCU are excluded from this study since RTL simulation of those components 
requires additional high-level models available only for the Solaris OS on SPARC machines.  
7 Because the OpenSPARC T2 distribution does not provide RTL source of the PCI Express 
controller, we used an industrial implementation of state-of-the-art PCI Express generation 3 
controller design to model soft error effects in I/O controllers. 
3.1 Flip-flops Targeted for Error Injection 
Our soft error injection study excludes flip-flops that are already 
protected or inactive during normal operation. L2C, MCU, and PCIe have 
built-in error detection and recovery / error correction, such as ECC and 
CRC, to address errors inside memory arrays. Flip-flops storing ECC or 
CRC encoded data are effectively protected. Since a single bit-flip in those 
flip-flops does not affect application-level behavior (after error correction / 
recovery), they are excluded from error injection. The inactive flip-flops are 
dedicated to built-in self-test and redundant arrays to repair defective 
SRAM cells. For this study, we assume a defect-free chip where these flip-
flops are not utilized. Table 4 shows the number of flip-flops targeted for 
error injection in the L2C, MCU, CCX, and PCIe modules. 
Table 4. Number of flip-flops in the targeted uncore components. 
Uncore component 
(number of instances 
in OpenSPARC T2) 
Error injection target 
flip-flops per instance 
(% of total flip-flops) 
Excluded from error injection 
Protected Inactive 
L2C (8) 18,369 (58.0%) 8,650 (27.3%) 4,656 (14.7%) 
MCU (4) 12,007 (66.4%) 4,782 (26.5%) 1,279 (7.1%) 
CCX (1) 41,181 (99.2%) 0 (0%) 340 (0.8%) 
PCIe (1) 23,483 (80.9%) 5,539 (19.1%) 0 (0%) 
3.2. Benchmark Applications 
We use a wide range of multi-threaded benchmark applications: 6 
SPLASH-2 benchmarks [Woo 95], 9 PARSEC-2.1 benchmarks8 [Bienia 
11], and 3 Phoenix MapReduce benchmarks for shared-memory systems 
[Yoo 09] (Table 5). To fully utilize OpenSPARC T2’s 64 hardware 
threads, we instantiated 64 threads for each benchmark application. For 
PCIe error injections, we modeled a situation where PCIe I/O is used to 
transfer the application’s input data files. In our benchmark set, 12 
applications have input data file as shown in Table 5, and they are used 
for PCIe error injection runs. For each benchmark, we ran more than 
40,000 error injection runs for each target uncore component. We assume 
that only one soft error happens for each application run9. 
Table 5. Benchmark applications. 
Benchmark application 
Error-free execution 
time (cycles) 
Input data 
file size 
SPLASH-2 
Barnes (barn) 413M No input file 
Cholesky (chol) 531M 1.7MB 
FFT (fft) 862M No input file 
LU-contiguous (lu-c) 215M No input file 
Radix (radi) 120M No input file 
Raytrace (rayt) 1,005M 4.5MB 
PARSEC-
2.1 
Blackscholes (blsc) 164M 258KB 
Bodytrack (body) 571M 2.5MB 
Ferret (ferr) 763M 4.7MB 
Fluidanimate (flui) 842M 1.3MB 
Freqmine (freq) 353M 8.0MB 
Streamcluster  (stre) 695M No input file 
Swaptions (swap) 591M No input file 
Vips (vips) 1,003M 7.6MB 
X264 (x264) 881M 2.8MB 
Phoenix 
MapReduce 
Linear regression (p-lr) 54M 108MB 
String match (p-sm) 248M 108MB 
Word count (p-wc) 566M 99MB 
We used the following five outcome categories, used in related studies, 
to classify application-level outcomes [Cho 13, Sanda 08, Wang 04]: 1) 
Application Output Not Affected (ONA), 2) Application Output 
Mismatch (OMM), 3) Unexpected Termination (UT), 4) Hang, and 5) 
Vanished.  
3.3. Application-level Erroneous Outcome Rates 
Our soft error simulation results demonstrate that uncore soft errors can 
have significant impact on the overall chip-level soft error rate. Figure 3 
shows the observed erroneous outcome rates for each of the uncore 
components across the benchmark applications and their arithmetic means. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
8 Facesim application is not tested because the input file for simulation is not included in the 
benchmark suite. Raytrace application from PARSEC is not tested because it produces no 
output files, and it is not possible to validate the application results. 
9 The interval between flip-flop soft errors is usually much longer compared to the length of the 
target benchmark applications [Mukherjee 05]. Actual failure rate of the system can be derived 
by applying technology-dependent soft error rate to the observed application-level outcome 
rates per injected soft error. 
 For example, in Fig. 3a, error injections into L2C for Barnes resulted in 
0.42% of ONA, 0.02% of OMM, 1.34% of UT, 0.26% of Hang, and 
97.96% of Vanished outcomes.  
As expected, most injected soft errors resulted in the Vanished outcome 
type (over 97% of cases on average). Out of non-Vanished outcomes, UT 
is the most frequent outcome type for L2C and CCX errors (0.69% on 
average). However, depending on the application, OMM rates are also 
significant. For example, the OMM rate for L2C is 0.3% for Fluidanimate 
and 0.42% for Streamcluster. PCIe error injection results show higher 
OMM rates (0.89% on average) compared to other components. Since 
PCIe transfers input data files in our simulations, soft errors in the PCIe 
likely affect data values. On the other hand, soft errors in other uncore 
components may corrupt control-related program variables, such as pointers 
or condition variables that may result in UT or Hang outcomes. Overall, the 
probability of having an erroneous application outcome (non-Vanished) for 
a single flip-flop soft error is 1.4%, 1.7%, 2.2%, and 1.7% for L2C, MCU, 
CCX, and PCIe, respectively. 
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Figure 3. Application-level erroneous outcome rates resulting from error 
injection for uncore components. (a) L2C. (b) MCU. (c) CCX. (d) PCIe.  
The OMM outcome type is a serious reliability concern because, unlike 
the UT and the Hang outcome types, the user may not be aware that the 
application resulted in erroneous outputs (unless there are additional 
mechanisms to verify the correctness of outputs). Figure 4 compares the 
observed OMM rates obtained from our uncore soft error injection runs to 
the OMM rates of processor core soft errors reported in the literature10. 
The observed OMM rates of uncore soft errors are comparable to that of 
processor cores, showing that understanding soft error resilience is 
important for uncore components in the studied OpenSPARC T2 design. 
 
Figure 4. OMM rate of uncore components and processor cores (per instance). 
Error bars are showing the minimum and maximum values observed across 
benchmark applications. (LEON: LEON3 SPARC [Cho 13], IVM: IVM ALPHA 
[Cho 13], Power: IBM POWER6 [Sanda 08], and OR: OpenRISC [Meixner 07]). 
4. Mixed-mode Platform Accuracy 
Unlike RTL-only simulations or FPGA-based emulations, where the 
system is simulated at the flip-flop level all the time, our mixed-mode 
platform models detailed flip-flop behaviors only during the co-
simulation mode. Hence, it is important to quantify the accuracy of our 
approach. 
4.1 Warm-up Period of Co-simulation Mode 
To show that only a 1,000 cycle warm-up period is enough to restore 
the microarchitectural states not included in the high-level uncore model 
(before an error is injected at the flip-flop), we compared the logic value 
of each microarchitectural state bit of our mixed-mode simulation setup 
(during co-simulation mode) vs. a simulation setup that runs the RTL co-
simulation from the very beginning (i.e., full-co-simulation). In Fig. 5, the 
Y-axis represents the percentage of bits in our mixed-mode setup (during 
co-simulation mode) that do not match the corresponding bit in the full-
co-simulation mode (unless the bit in the full-co-simulation mode is still 
unknown). The results are averaged over 10,000 runs. After 1,000 cycles 
into the co-simulation mode, the microarchitectural state of our mixed-
mode platform closely matches that of the full-co-simulation (difference 
less than 0.2%). 
  
Figure 5. Microarchitectural state difference during the warm-up period. 
4.2. Limited Co-simulation Length  
As discussed before, the co-simulation mode terminates early if the 
outcome of the application run is determined or if only states modeled by 
high-level uncore models are erroneous. However, in a few cases, errors 
may persist in uncore microarchitectural states not modeled by high-level 
uncore models for extended periods of simulation time. For these cases, 
limiting co-simulation length is a trade-off between simulation efficiency 
and accuracy of the obtained results. For our error injection study, only a 
small subset of soft errors that are injected into a small number of flip-
flops result in such situations past 100K cycles of co-simulation. Hence, 
we limit co-simulation length to 100K cycles. These flip-flops represent 
3.7%, 2%, 3.4%, and 3.3% of all flip-flops in L2C, MCU, CCX, and PCIe, 
respectively (Fig. 6). Out of all error injection runs, only 1.8% actually 
result in situations in which errors in uncore microarchitectural states not 
modeled by high-level uncore models persist past 100K co-simulation 
cycles (L2C: 1.8%, MCU: 0.4%, CCX: 1.5% and PCIe: 1.4% of their 
respective total runs).  
Extending the co-simulation length beyond 100K cycles slows down 
simulation and has diminishing returns in further determining application 
outcomes (e.g., extending co-simulation cycle limit by 10× to 1M cycles 
increases the co-simulation time 10-fold, but the percentage of error 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
10 The results are based on injecting one soft error into a single target component (single uncore 
component or single processor core). The results do not reflect any radiation-hardening techniques 
or device technologies that have stronger soft error resilience (e.g., SOI [Loveless 11, Oldiges 09]) . 
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 injection runs for L2C with errors persisting beyond the cycle limit is 
reduced from 1.8% to 1.4% only). Since these errors might vanish if given 
more co-simulation cycles, we do not report them as erroneous outcomes 
in Figs. 3 and 4. However, one may conservatively choose to protect these 
flip-flops for error resilient design, as we did in our study of QRR 
described in Sec. 5. 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of flip-flops that result in situations in which errors in 
uncore microarchitectural states not modeled by high-level uncore models 
persist beyond the given co-simulation cycles. 
4.3. Application-level Outcomes Accuracy 
We compare the observed outcome rates from our mixed-mode 
platform vs. those obtained from RTL-only simulations. Due to the slow 
speed of RTL simulators, the comparison is limited to the FFT application 
with a smaller data set (1M cycles of execution time), running on 4 
threads without an OS. ONA and OMM types are categorized into one 
outcome type because no specific output generation function (e.g., file 
write) is implemented in this setup. Figure 7 compares the observed 
application-level erroneous outcome rates from the two setups obtained 
from 40,000 error injection samples each. The observed rates from our 
mixed-mode platform closely matches (0.9-1.1×) those from the RTL-
only simulations. 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of observed erroneous outcome rates from RTL-only 
simulations vs. those from our mixed-mode platform. Error bars represent 
the 95% confidence intervals. 
5. System-level Checkpoint Recovery Challenges 
Many error resilience solutions depend on system-level checkpoint 
recovery techniques to revert the system to an error-free state upon error 
detection [Elnozahy 02]. One major challenge for ensuring correct 
recovery is the output commit problem that may incur long delays for 
system outputs. Since rollback recovery may not be able to invalidate 
committed outputs to the outside world, such as network packets or 
human interactions, outputs should be committed only when it is 
guaranteed that the system won’t roll back to a state before the outputs 
were produced [Elnozahy 02, Nakano 06]. To avoid such long output 
delays, two conditions must be satisfied: 1) errors must be detected 
quickly (short error detection latency) and 2) the recovery operation 
should not revert the system to a very old state during rollback to an error-
free state (i.e., rollback distance should be short). 
5.1. Long Error Detection Latency of Uncore Soft Errors  
Error detection techniques at the software and processor architecture 
levels, such as EDDI [Oh 02] and RMT [Mukherjee 08], can detect 
uncore errors only after a processor core sees an erroneous output from 
the uncore component. Therefore, the shortest error detection latency for 
such techniques is longer than the error propagation latency to processor 
cores, i.e., the duration from the cycle when a soft error affects an uncore 
component until the cycle when uncore component produces an erroneous 
output to the processor cores. 
 For soft errors injected in the uncore components associated with the 
memory subsystem (L2C, MCU, and CCX) of OpenSPARC T2, we 
observed very long error propagation latencies (Fig. 5). For example, soft 
errors in L2C take 36 million cycles to propagate to processor cores on 
average. For processor cores, in contrast, errors can be detected quickly 
within a short amount of time [Maniatakos 11a, Smolens 04]. Proactively 
loading and comparing memory values from uncore components can 
reduce error propagation and detection latencies, but the associated 
execution time impact can be high [Lin 14]. 
Figure 8. Cumulative distribution of uncore error propagation latencies to 
processor cores. 
5.2. Long Rollback Distance for Uncore Soft Errors 
To ensure short rollback distance, the checkpointing mechanism has to 
create checkpoints frequently (short checkpoint interval). To frequently 
create checkpoints, the data size of each checkpoint has to be kept small 
due to the limited checkpoint storage size and bandwidth. To achieve 
small checkpoint data size, incremental checkpointing techniques are used 
[Prvulovic 02, Sorin 02]. They reduce the data size of each checkpoint by 
saving logs of memory locations 11 modified by processor cores between 
two checkpoints.  
For soft errors in uncore components, however, such techniques may 
not be adequate. For example, suppose that processor cores modified 
memory contents in the address range [X-Y] (and, hence, only those 
memory contents were included in an incremental checkpoint). However, 
a soft error in L2C might corrupt the content of memory address Z which 
is outside the range [X-Y] (due to an address-related error). In such a case, 
the recovery mechanism must roll back to an older state with an error-free 
log on address Z.  
The required roll back distance to recover from corrupted values in an 
arbitrary memory location is determined by when a processor core last 
modified that memory location.  
Figure 9 shows the cumulative distribution of required rollback 
distances resulting from soft errors in L2C and MCU. To cover more than 
99% of soft errors resulting in memory corruptions, the required rollback 
distance can be longer than 400M cycles.  
 
Figure 9. Cumulative distribution of required rollback distance resulting from 
soft errors in L2C and MCU. 
6. Uncore Soft Error Resilience Using Quick Replay Recovery  
Uncore soft error resilience can be achieved by utilizing radiation-
hardened flip-flops [Lilja 13, Mitra 05], but the associated costs can be 
high (Table 6). Logic parity [Mitra 00] can detect errors with very short 
error detection latency; combined with an efficient recovery technique, 
logic parity can provide a low-cost error resilience solution. For processor 
cores, efficient error recovery techniques exist (e.g., by flushing 
instructions [Ando 03, Mukherjee 08], or by using instruction-level retry 
[Meaney 05]). For uncore components, such mechanisms are inadequate 
due to the following reasons:  
1. As discussed in Sec. 2.1, uncore components process request packets 
from processor cores. Those request packets need to be recreated for 
recovery. An uncore component may not be able to regenerate request 
packets by itself. 
2. Requesting processor cores to resend request packets may not always be 
possible since processor cores may not store information about request 
packets being processed by uncore components. For example, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
11 Other architectural states, such as register values, have much smaller size compared to the 
main memory state, and usually do not require incremental checkpointing. 
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 OpenSPARC T2 processor cores retain request packets only until L2C 
sends corresponding return packets. However, L2C may continue to 
process a request even after sending the return packet to the processor 
core. For example, if a request results in a store miss, L2C may spend 
hundreds of cycles to fetch a cache line even after sending the return 
packet. In this case, the uncore operation may be affected by a soft error 
even after the processor removes the request packet (upon receipt of the 
return packet).  
3. Reverting processor cores, along with the erroneous uncore component, 
may result in a cascaded rollbacks since each uncore component can 
interact with multiple processor cores and/or uncore components. For 
example, rolling back a processor core might require rolling back the 
uncore components the processor core interacted with, such as other 
instances of L2C. This, in turn, might require rolling back other 
processor cores that interacted with those uncore components. 
To overcome these challenges, we present a new technique called Quick 
Replay Recovery (QRR) targeting uncore components (Fig. 6). QRR 
handles soft errors without engaging processor cores during recovery. It is 
applicable for uncore components that satisfy the following properties: 
1. Executing requests multiple times in the same order does not change 
the outcome. For example, this property is maintained in storage 
components such as memory where duplicated operations in the same 
order do not change the outcome. (For a detailed discussion regarding 
this property in the presence of requests accessing the same address, 
please refer to Sec. 6.3). 
2. The uncore component should be able to resume its operation upon 
reset of its flip-flop contents. For flip-flop contents that should not be 
reset, such as flip-flops used for configuration bits (e.g., cache disable 
bit in L2C), radiation-hardening can be selectively used to protect those 
flip-flops (fewer than 3% for L2C and MCU) from soft errors. 
In this paper, QRR works in conjunction with logic parity-based error 
detection (other error detection techniques with very short error detection 
latencies are also possible). It provides the following functionality:  
1. Record request packets using a record table in the QRR controller. 
Packets are stored in that table when a new request packet is sent to the 
uncore component, and deleted from the table when the associated 
operation is completed by the uncore component (Details in Sec. 6.1). 
Flip-flops in the QRR controller are protected using radiation hardening.  
2. When logic parity detects an error, the QRR controller performs 
recovery operation by resending the request packets in the record table 
to the uncore component (Details in Sec. 6.2). 
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Figure 6. QRR for L2C and MCU. QRR components are shaded.  
We evaluate QRR for the L2C and MCU modules for which traditional 
checkpoint recovery techniques are inadequate (Sec. 4). Because MCU 
receives access requests through L2C only (e.g., cache line fill, eviction, 
or non-cached direct DRAM access), recording and replaying L2C 
requests effectively covers MCU requests as well12. QRR incurs a small 
performance impact during recovery. For L2C, in the worst case when 
every replayed packet results in the longest operation (L2 cache load 
miss), the recovery takes fewer than 5,000 cycles. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
12 Since an MCU instance operates with two L2C instances in OpenSPARC T2, soft error 
detection in an MCU invokes recovery operation of two QRR controllers in the two L2C 
instances. 
6.1. QRR Normal Operation 
During normal operation, the QRR controller keeps track of request 
packets that are being processed in the uncore component using its record 
table. QRR for an L2C instance maintains a total ordering of all 
incomplete requests to that instance based on their arrival order. This is a 
stricter ordering than the original design, which only needs to maintain 
the arrival ordering between requests to the same cache line in order to 
preserve the required SPARC total store ordering (TSO) [OpenSPARC]. 
Since each L2C and MCU instance exclusively serves disjoint memory 
address ranges, maintaining ordering at each L2C instance (bank) is 
sufficient (without affecting requests being processed by other instances).  
When requests are completed without errors, they no longer need to be 
stored by the QRR controller. A completion of a request is determined by 
monitoring return packets to the processor cores. For uncore requests that 
require post processing even after the return packet, additional monitoring 
may be required. In L2C, the only return packet type requiring additional 
monitoring is a store miss. In this case, the QRR controller waits until the 
cache miss handling logic (Miss Buffer) in L2C completes the operation 
before deleting the corresponding entry.  
6.2. QRR Replay Recovery Operation 
When logic parity detects an error, QRR first disables write enable 
signals to data arrays (e.g., L2 cache tag, data, and DRAM) and valid 
signals of data ports connected to processor cores or other uncore 
components to prevent the error from corrupting those arrays and 
propagating to other components.  
Propagating the parity error detection signal to the QRR controller and 
invoking the recovery operation may take multiple cycles because signals 
from multiple parity detectors have to be aggregated. If a (detected) flip-
flop error propagates to a data array or to another component within a few 
cycles vs. the number of cycles required to propagate the aggregated error 
signal to the QRR controller, then the soft error might corrupt the 
corresponding data array or the connected component before the recovery 
operation is invoked. This creates a non-zero chance of corrupt outputs 
being produced by the SoC. In our current implementation, we managed 
this issue by manually inspecting cases where such situations might arise, 
and fixed the issues by routing individual error signals to disable writes to 
data arrays and valid signals to other components as needed. 
The next step is to assert the reset signal of the uncore component to 
clear its flip-flop values. Accepting new request packets from processor 
cores is postponed until recovery is completed. After reset, the QRR 
controller sends recorded packets to the uncore component in the recorded 
order until all recorded incomplete request packets are replayed. After the 
replay completes, the uncore component resumes normal operation by 
starting to accept new request packets form processor cores.   
6.3 QRR Correctness  
QRR can successfully recover errors for the following reasons:  
1. For L2C and MCU, executing incomplete request packets multiple times 
(replay) does not change the outcome. As long as multiple concurrent 
requests do not access the same address (i.e., no dependency between 
concurrent requests), replaying requests in a given order results in the 
same outcome. If there are dependencies between request packets, L2C is 
designed not to begin the processing of the following request until the 
previous one completes (i.e., ordering is maintained).  
2. By enforcing a stricter ordering between recorded requests (vs. the 
default memory ordering of the target uncore component), requests 
replayed by QRR do not violate the memory access order of the 
original requests. 
3. A detected soft error does not change the outcome of replayed 
operations since the erroneous flip-flop values are reset by the QRR 
controller, the contents of the SRAM and DRAM arrays are preserved, 
and data signals to other components are invalidated (except for the 
corner case situation discussed in Sec. 6.2).  
6.4. QRR Results 
We implemented QRR for the L2C and MCU modules of OpenSPARC 
T2, and evaluated its effectiveness using our mixed-mode platform.  
To minimize the cost of parity-based error detection, we selectively 
used radiation hardening for the following flip-flops: 
 1. Flip-flops with timing slack shorter than the path delay of the XOR tree 
used to calculate a parity bit.  In such a case, logic parity may not be a 
cost-effective solution since it is not possible to place the XOR tree 
without slowing down the clock or using additional flip-flops to split 
the XOR tree over multiple clock cycles. 1,650 flip-flops of L2C (9%), 
36 flip-flops of MCU (0.3%) belong to this category.  
2. Configuration flip-flops where reset and replay may fail to restore the 
required flip-flop values. These flip-flops are excluded from reset. 55 flip-
flops of L2C (0.3%), 309 flip-flops of MCU (2.5%) belong to this category. 
3. Flip-flops in the QRR controller. 812 flip-flops per instance (~3% of the 
flip-flops in L2C and MCU) belong to this category. Since the flip-flops 
in the QRR controller are hardened, we did not protect the tables in the 
QRR controller (assuming single soft errors). 
The rest of the flip-flops in the uncore components are protected by logic 
parity and QRR. After synthesis and place-and-route, the logic area and 
power overheads 13  of QRR are 45.9% and 47.4% at each uncore 
component level (3.32% and 6.09% at chip-level for all L2C and MCU 
instances), which are 23% and 31% lower than the logic area and power 
costs of protecting all flip-flops using hardening, respectively (Table 6). 
Table 6. QRR area and power overhead for L2C and MCU. Flip-flops in 
the QRR controller are protected using radiation-hardening. 
Overhead 
QRR Hardening 
only (chip-
level) 
Parity Hardening 
QRR controller 
and record table 
Total  
(chip-level) 
Area  32.5% 7.6% 5.8% 45.9% (3.32%) 60.3% (4.34%) 
Power  34.8% 8.7% 3.9% 47.4% (6.09%) 68.3% (8.78%) 
From simulations using the same set of applications as in Sec. 3.2, 
QRR successfully recovered from all errors injected into the flip-flops 
covered by logic parity for over 400,000 error injection runs for L2C and 
MCU14. Flip-flops protected using radiation hardening (less than 10% of 
total flip-flops of L2C and MCU), however, may result in erroneous 
outcomes since they have non-zero soft error rates. Assuming 1,000× soft 
error rate reduction of radiation-hardened flip-flops [Lilja 13], the 
probability of having a flip-flop soft error in the uncore component with 
QRR is less than 0.013%15 of that of the same uncore component without 
QRR. Even with a conservative assumption that all those soft errors result 
in erroneous (non-Vanished) outcomes, QRR achieves over 100× 
improvement (i.e., reduction) in the erroneous outcome rate compared to 
the erroneous outcome rates shown in Sec. 3.3.  
7. Conclusion 
Studying the application-level effects of uncore soft errors in large-
scale SoCs is important but difficult. Our new mixed-mode simulation 
platform enables us to accurately and effectively model uncore soft errors 
while achieving 20,000-fold speedup compared to RTL simulations. This 
platform enabled us to characterize, for the first time, system-level effects 
of soft errors in various uncore components of a large and industrial-grade 
multi-core SoC.  
Our results show that uncore soft errors can have significant impact on 
the overall reliability of for the studied OpenSPARC T2 multi-core SoC. 
Hence, resilience techniques to overcome uncore soft errors are required. 
However, uncore soft errors pose several challenges for traditional 
system-level checkpointing techniques that are generally effective for 
processor cores. Our Quick Replay Recovery approach overcomes these 
challenges for uncore components in the memory subsystem of 
OpenSPARC T2.  
Future research directions include studying system-level effects of a 
broader class of errors in uncore components (beyond just soft errors), 
and cross-layer error resilience techniques (spanning circuit, logic, 
architecture, software, and application layers) for uncore components. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
13 The area overhead is obtained using the Synopsys Design Compiler and a commercial 28nm 
technology library. The power overhead is calculated using the Synopsys PrimeTime and 
application execution traces. Chip-level overhead is estimated based on published data in 
related OpenSPARC T2 studies [Jung 14, Li 13]. 
14 A more desirable approach is to create a formal proof. With error injection simulations, there 
can be (rare) corner cases in which QRR may not succeed in recovering correctly from errors.  
15 90% (flip-flops protected by logic parity detection and QRR recovery) × 0 + 10% (radiation 
hardened flip-flops) × 1/1,000  + 3% (radiation hardened flip-flops in the QRR controller flip-
flops) × 1/1,000= 0.013% 
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